Accessing
The
POWER
of
power-WORDS

Therefore ìôéëê	5
A - therefore - B         There is something in   A  which logically leads to  B	5
Even    àôéìå	6
Extends our idea of something to a level beyond what we expect by telling us that the idea applies even to something which we thought was beyond it.	6
The reason is...        èòîä	7
Introduces a mistake we can make by assuming that the underlying reason for a Halacha is...	7
We have just just mentioned a Halacha.  We can say that the underlying reason for that aforesaid Halacha is...	7
åéàîä	9
Rebbi. . .raised-up       øáé . . . øîé	9
And he raised-up               åøîéðäé	9
And they raised-up           åøîéðäå	9
Contradicting a statement by quoting a source of equal authority which gives a different decision to the úéåáúà	11
He objected   àéúéáéä	11
They objected îéúéáé	11
An objection to a statement by quoting an authority against it.	11
àú÷ôúà	13
Rabbi  argued with him       îú÷éó ìéä øáé	13
An objection to a statement by trying to refute it by force of logic.	13
áòéà	14
They asked them   àáòéà ìäå	14
They asked him    áòå îéðéä	14
He asked him áòà îéðéä	14
An enquiry to find out which one of a choice of options is the correct option.	14
áùìîä. . . . .àìà	16
Differentiation of the Halacha into two parts, one part of which seems reasonable, but the other part of which does not seem reasonable	16
An halacha is stated which can apply to several circumstances. But the statement of the halacha makes no reference to any differences between any circumstances.	16
áùìîä ìãéãé. . . . .àìà ìãéãê	17
I can understand that it is alright according to me, but	17
according to you . .	17
àéìéîà . . . . .äà . . . àìà ìàå	18
Elimination of an obvious case in order to show that the case must be a less obvious one	18
ìà ùðå àìà ..... àáì .........	20
What seems to be a general statement which is applicable to us, is actually referring to a particular situation and so does not apply to us.	20
ìéîà ëúðàé	21
Let us say that this argument is over the same points as those which those Tannaim are arguing over.	21
îàé ìàå áäà ÷îéôìâé	22
Isn't it true that actually they are arguing over the following?	22
ìà îáòé ÷àîø	23
It does not need to say it	23
äëà áîàé òñ÷éðï	25
What are the circumstances of the case we are talking about here	25
ðéôìåâ åìéùðà áãéãéä	27
Let the Mishna then make that distinction within that class itself.	27
úñúééí	29
Let us sort it out	29
...îðìï            ...... äëé äùúä ......	30
From where do we know that?       Now, let's see (does it make sense?(	30
åìèòîéê  / åìãéãê	31
And according to your way of reasoning...........	31
åúðé .........     ÷à ôñé÷	32
[The Tanna) surely states decisively and learns	32
àîàé ìà	33
Why not ? ? ! ! !	33
.......               ìà ùðà............åìà ùðà	34
No difference....       And no difference......	34
THE  THIRTEEN  RULES  BY  WHICH  THE  TORAH  IS  EXPOUNDED	35
1.          ÷ì åçåîø	36
2.   äé÷ù            âæøä ùåä	39
3.                 áðéï àá                    îä îîöéðå	40
4.           ëìì åôøè	41
5.         ôøè  åëìì	42
6. ëìì åôøè åëìì	43
øáåé åîéòåè	44
îéòåè  åøáåé	45
c. øáåé åîéòåè åøáåé	46
7.           ëìì ùäåà öøéê ìôøè          ôøè ùäåà öøéê ìëìì	48
8. ëì ãáø ùäéä áëìì åéöà îï äëìì ììîã ìà ììîã òì òöîå éöà àìà ììîã òì äëìì ëìå éöà	49
9. ëì ãáø ùäéä áëìì åéöà  ìèòåï èòåï àçø  ùäåà ëòðéðå éöà ìä÷ì åìà ìäçîéø	50
10. ëì ãáø ùäéä áëìì åéöà ìèòåï èòåï àçø ùìà ëòðéðå éöà ìä÷ì åìäçîéø	51
11.    ëì ãáø ùäéä áëìì   åéöà   ìãåï áãáø äçãù àé àúä éëåì ìäçæéøå ìëììå   òã ùéçæéøðå äëúåá ìëììå áôéøåù	52
12.    ãáø äìîã îòðéðå  åãáø äìåîã îñåôå	53
13.    ùðé ëúåáéí     äîëçéùéí æä àú æä  òã ùéáåà äëúåá äùìéùé  åéëøéò áéðéäí	54

Types of Words

Words which give names to things which are....
Words which name actions...
Words which tell you more about things which are..
Words which tell more about actions
Words which tell you relationships
Words which join ideas
Words which ask questions
		table, cloud, one, happiness, envigoration
walk, eat, think, go
green, big, soft, long.
quickly, quietly, fast,
above, with, near, in
and, but, if, because
Why? How? When?	

Johnny! I might want you to run to some place - perhaps the shop - perhaps to buy something - I'm not sure what! Hurry up and do it!

I'm sorry for Johnny. He doesn't know what to do, where to go - but he has to hurry up and do it!
Often, we find ourselves in the same situation. We know we have to hurry up and do something with our lives, but we don't know what to do or how to do it!

To sort out the situation, we need clear, precise definitions.

You
must
go
to
the
Store
to buy
a
small loaf of white bread		Whoever is being spoken to
Term of compulsion - no option to say "I don't want to!"
Mode of transport is left open
There is going to be a target
Definate article - I'm supposed to know which one...
Okay - now I know where I have to go
Now I know what I have to do
only one
I'm on my way!	

Now, with a clear mind, Johnny can do his errend, relaxed and confident and able to direct all his energies to fulfilling his mission in life at that moment.

The foundation of piety and the root of a persons true work in this world is for him to calarify exactly what his obligations are.

Clarification of instructions requires clear and precise definitions.This means that we must be able to understand the exact information being imparted by each word. Not all words can be taken at face value.

Some words are to be taken at face value - they mean what they say - no more and no less.
Some words represent an idea to be conveyed by the word - not the literal meaning of the word.
Some words are legal words which need to be defined.
Some words are references to other ideas or concepts.

For example,  the Mishna says:-   ארבעה אבות נזיקין 
   ארבעהmeans four - no more and no less.
אבות   cannot refer to regular fathers - the word must represent a type of realtionship - fathers/son or cause/effect
נזיקין   damages - that's a legal word! How do you define what a person is responsible for - can we always force him to pay for all the damage he does?
We use words to tell us the nature of things.

What is it?

Is it the whole or is it a part?

Is it a generality or is it a particular?

Is it a cause or is it an effect?

Does it tell us new information or does it help us understand what we already know?

Therefore ìôéëê     

A - therefore - B         There is something in   A  which logically leads to  B
Example:-

It is raining, therefore I must take an umbrella.

Analysis

1. It is raining
2. Rain makes thing wet
3. I do not want to get wet
4. I must avoid getting wet

Options to avoid getting wet
		Reasons for not using the option	
1. Do not go out in the rain		I have to go somewhere	
2. Wait until the rain stops		I cannot wait	
3. Wear a raincoat		I have not got one
I do not like it
It is not my size
It is not good enough	
4. Go under coverings		There are no coverings all the way 	
5. Use an umbrella		Good idea!	

Conclusions

It is raining, therefore I must take an umbrella, only when:-

The rain makes things wet
I do not want to get wet
I have to go out
I cannot wait until the rain stops
I do not have a suitable raincoat
There is no coverage all the way.

If these conditions do not apply, perhaps I will not take an umbrella.

Example  from the גמרא

     áåðéï àú äëåúì áòîöò...
לפיכך
àí ðôì
äî÷åí åäàáðéí ùì ùðéäí

ááà áúøà á.
Analysis

1. The wall is built in the middle		4. They must build the wall together	
2. They share the site of the wall		5. They did both pay for the bricks	
3. The site of the wall belongs to both of them		6. They both own the bricks equally.	
Even    àôéìå

Extends our idea of something to a level beyond what we expect by telling us that the idea applies even to something which we thought was beyond it.

Example

This car is so well-built it will even go cross-country.

Analysis

1. A regular car is built only to go on a paved highway.
2. If a regular car goes cross-country it will shake to pieces.
3. Going cross-country is therefore beyond the strength of a regular car.
4. The strength of this car goes beyond the normal strength of a car because this car can go cross-country. 

Example  from the גמרא

ãìî"ã (äéæ÷ øàéä) ùîéä äæé÷
àèöøéê ìàùîåòðéï
ãàôéìå áçöø ùîéä äæé÷
ááà áúøà á. çéãåùé äøùá"à

1. Invasion of privacy of a house is definately called a damage.
2. A courtyard is not such a private place as the inside of a house.
3. So the the invasion of privacy of a courtyard is not as damaging as that of a house.
4. So I would normally think that the criminally-damaging aspect of invasion of privacy extends to looking inside a house but not to looking in a courtyard 
5. Therefore, the Mishna needs to specify the word çöø  to tell me that the criminally-damaging aspect of invasion of privacy extends to even to looking in a courtyard 
The reason is...        èòîä

Introduces a mistake we can make by assuming that the underlying reason for a Halacha is...
We have just just mentioned a Halacha.  We can say that the underlying reason for that aforesaid Halacha is...

An important stage in learning through a sugya is recognizing the standard words and phrases of the Gemora.

These standard words and phrases serve as signposts, indicating the way the discussion is going to develop.

The exact meanings of standard words and phrases has been the topic of many classic seforim, including some by Rishonom and early Acharonim. However, a valuable accessory to learning how to learn is for you to make your own dictionary of them.

As you learn through the Gemora, look out for words or phrases which appear time after time which tell you how the discussion is proceeding or going to proceed.

For example, the Gemora might say
äëà áîàé òñ÷éðï àéìéîà......    àìà (ìàå) ......       ìà  ìòåìí ......

If you recognize this standard pattern, then as soon as you see the first few words  äëà áîàé òñ÷éðï àéìéîà  you will be ready for the Gemora to tell a first explanation which the Gemora will then refute. Then the Gemora will introduce a second attempt at an
explanation introduced by àìà (ìàå) which might also be refuted.

Then the Gemora might return to the original explanation, introduced by  .ìà  ìòåìí Then, the Gemora will have to explain why the original refutation does not deter us from reconsidering that original explanation.

Preferably, write down these standard words and phrases onto cards which you can file in alphabetical order. With each, write down the literal translation. Then, define the exact function which it plays in the argument and quote the example you found.

Then, when you meet this phrase again, see how it matches your definition. You might need to modify your original definition to accommodate its use in other places, or you might decide that the word or phrase can actually be used in several different and distinct ways. You will then need to give a clear definition of each use.

In the following section are descriptions of some common standard words and phrases. Some of them can also be used in other ways to those described. Some of them might be the subject of argument between authorities.

Use them as a rough guide to making your own list.

Accustom yourself to isolating the reality of the words - how would you use them in your own discussions?
 åéàîä

Rebbi. . .raised-up       øáé . . . øîé
And he raised-up               åøîéðäé
And they raised-up           åøîéðäå    

Contradicting a statement by quoting a source of equal authority which gives a different decision to the statement.

One person uses an authoritative source to prove his opinion. So another person questions the value of that authority by quoting a contradictory source of equal authority.

Reuven said to Shimon, "I'm going swimming because the Mashgiach said that we can go swimming."

Shimon responded, "But the Rosh Yeshiva said that we're not allowed to go swimming!" (Note:- Shimon is not himself arguing with Reuven - he is only bewildered by the fact that the Mashgiach contradicted what the Mashgiach is reported to have said!)

Possible response    éůĺá

Reuven can say, "The Mashgiach was talking about going during seder, but I asked the Rosh Yeshiva about going during lunch-break and he said it was okay."

Analysis

1 Reuven implies that it is okay for him to go swimming, "I am.going swimming."

  2 Reuven backs-up the statement by quoting an authority, "The. Mashgiach said we can go swimming."

3 Shimon counters by quoting another authority of similar. seniority which contradicts and therefore undermines the power of Reuven's back-up, "But the Rosh Yeshiva said that we're not allowed to go swimming!"

CONCLUSION

We are now in a quandary.

We cannot say that Reuven is wrong, because he has the Rosh Yeshiva behind him.

On the other hand, we would not like to go against the Mashgiach.

So, we cannot stop Reuven from going swimming, but he cannot convince us that we can go with him.

There are now several options open.

i. Reuven can now explain that in fact there is no contradiction between the two authorities. Both are correct, but they apply to different circumstances, and the statement which seems to go against him actually does not apply to him.

ii. Reuven can try to prove that we do not have to worry about the authority quoted against him, because either

a. the quotation is not accurate, or
b. the statement is wrong,        or
c. he is not bound by that authority.

iii. Reuven has nothing to say about the contradiction

4 In our case, Reuven explains that in fact there is no.contradiction between the two authorities. Both are correct, but they apply to different circumstances, and the statement which seems to go against him actually does not apply to him.

.5 The Mashgiach said that it is okay to go because he was referring to going during lunch-break.

The Rosh Yeshiva said that it is wrong to go because he was. talking about going during seder.

 úéåáúà

 He objected   àéúéáéä
 They objected îéúéáé  

An objection to a statement by quoting an authority against it.

One person states his opinion. So another person questions the validity of that opinion by quoting a contradictory source of superior authority.

Reuven said to Shimon, "It's okay for me to go swimming during lunch-break."

Shimon objected, "But the Rosh Yeshiva said that we're not allowed to go swimming!"

Possible response éůĺá   

Reuvan said, "The Mashgiach was talking about everyone else, but the doctor said I need the exercise, so the Mashgiach said it is okay for me to go - for me, it's not a waste of time!."

Analysis

.1 Reuven says that it is okay for him to go swimming. Reuven does not back-up the statement by quoting any authority

.2 Shimon counters by quoting a senior authority which contradicts and therefore completely invalidates Reuven's statement.

 CONCLUSION

As as far as we are concerned, Reuven is wrong and we are not allowed to follow his example and we may even be obliged to stop him if he tries to go swimming.

There are now several options open.

i.   Reuven can now explain that in fact he has his own backing from a source at least as authoritative as the one quoted against him,
ii.  Reuven can explain that the quoted ruling does not apply to him,
iii. Reuven can try to prove that we do not have to worry about the authority quoted against him, because either
a. the quotation is not accurate, or
b. the statement is wrong,        or
c. he is not bound by that authority.
iv.  Reuven has no defence and accepts that he is wrong.

3. In our case, Reuven explains that the quoted ruling does not apply to him.

 àú÷ôúà

Rabbi  argued with him       îú÷éó ìéä øáé

An objection to a statement by trying to refute it by force of logic.

One person states his opinion. So another person questions the validity of that opinion by proving that, logically, it cannot be correct.

Reuven said to Shimon, "It's okay for us to go swimming during lunch-break." 
Shimon argued, "But the Mashgiach just gave us a whole talk about not wasting time!"

Possible response    éůĺá

Reuven said, "The Mashgiach was talking generally, but the doctor told me that I need the exercise, so the Mashgiach said that because I need it for my learning, it is okay for me to go."

 Analysis

1. Reuven says that it is okay for him to go swimming. Reuven.
does not back-up the statement by quoting any authority

2 Shimon counters by showing Reuven how logically he cannot be. correct.

CONCLUSION

As as far as we are concerned, Reuven is wrong and we are not allowed to follow his example and we may even be obliged to stop him if he tries to go swimming.

There are now several options open.

i Reuven can now explain that in fact he has his own backing from an authoritative source
ii.  Reuven can show that the logic is wrong,
iii. Reuven has no defence and accepts that he is wrong.

.3 In our case, Reuven explains that Shimon didn't know all the facts and so he came to the wrong conclusion.

áòéà

They asked them   àáòéà ìäå
They asked him    áòå îéðéä
He asked him áòà îéðéä   

An enquiry to find out which one of a choice of options is the correct option.

A certain halocha can be interpreted in two ways. So we ask, "Should we do this or should we do that?"

Reuven asked Shimon, "Is it okay for us to go swimming during lunch-break? On the one hand, it's a waste of time. On the other hand, I really feel that I need the exercise".

Possible response        éůĺá

Lets hear what the Mashgiach might say!

The Mashgiach might say, "If you really need the exercise, it is not a waste of time."

Analysis

.1 Reuven doesn't know what to do.

a. He feels that he needs exercise, so he wants to go swimming.
b. He doesn't want to waste time

So, what should he do?
A. Should he go swimming? or 
B. Should he not go swimming?

Reuven needs to be able to choose one course of action.

For this, he could use:  
i.   an authority which will decide for him
ii.  more information which will enablehim to decide
iii. logic which will show why one is better than the other

Or, it might be impossible for him to make a choice    (úé÷å)

2 In our case, Reuven asked the Mashgiach (an authority) who explained that if. the  swimming is necessary, it is not a waste of time (more information(.

áùìîä. . . . .àìà

Differentiation of the Halacha into two parts, one part of which seems reasonable, but the other part of which does not seem reasonable

An halacha is stated which can apply to several circumstances. But the statement of the halacha makes no reference to any differences between any circumstances.

So we must assume that the halacha is to be applied in all the circumstances.

But we are not happy with that. Because, whereas we can understand why the halacha should apply under some conditions, we cannot understand why it should apply under other conditions.

The Mashgiach said the boys are not allowed to go swimming. áùìîä I can understand why we cannot go during seder, àìà but I cannot see what is wrong with going during lunch-break.

Analysis

.1 The Mashgiach gives a ruling: Swimming is banned!

Presumably, this ruling is to be appplied to all times of the day, during seder, during lunch-break, etc.

 áùìîä 2I can understand why the ruling should apply to during seder

  àìà 3But I cannot understand why the ruling should apply to during lunch-break.

 áùìîä ìãéãé. . . . .àìà ìãéãê 

I can understand that it is alright according to me, but
according to you . .

A person who holds like one side of a argumant says to his opponent, "Consider Statement X (which they both agree is correct). According to my view, it is correct. But according to your view, it is not correct. Therefore)  ,by implication) your view must be wrong!"

Reuven: "The Yeshiva Secretary has just put a notice up on the bulletin-board inviting us to buy a season ticket for the swimming-pool at a reduced rate."

         áùìîä ìãéãé I maintain that the Yeshiva approves of us going swimming, so I can understand why they are telling us about the special offer.

            àìà ìãéãê But you, Shimon, how do you explain it?"

Analysis

1. Shimon cannot deny the existance of the notice - it is there on the board for all to see.
2. The notice was written by the Yeshiva secretary, so presumably it conforms to official Yeshiva policy.
.3 The notice fits in well with Reuven's view, but it seems to contradict Shimon's view.

.4 So, apparently, Reuven has defeated Shimon.

5. (However, perhaps, if we ask the secretary, he might explain that the notice is only for those few boys who have been told by the doctor that they must to go swimming!(

 àéìéîà . . . . .äà . . . àìà ìàå

Elimination of an obvious case in order to show that the case must be a less obvious one

An halalcha is stated, but the case to which it is to be applied is not specified. We would think that it obviously applies to a certain case, but that is not actually correct.

Really, it applies to a less obvious case. Therefore, we must show that if we try to apply the halacha to the obvious case, the result will not be correct. Therefore, it must apply to the less obvious case.

Reuven said, "The Rosh Yeshivah said that it is okay to go swimming. àéìéîà If you say that he was talking about Bain Hazemanim, äà then he wasn't saying anything new because the Yeshiva itself organizes trips to the swimmimg-pool. àìà ìàå So it must be that he meant during lunch-break."

Shimon said  , ìà "  No! I don't agree with you! ìòåìí It could be that the Rosh Yeshiva was talking about Bain Hazemanim. They're not organizing trips this year and the Rosh Yeshiva might feel that he needs to reassure us that we can still go."

Analysis

Generaly-speaking, bochurim cannot go swimming because they are
too busy.

.1 Reuven quoted a ruling made by the Rosh Yeshiva stating that it is okay to go swimming.

The statement itself does not mention when that ruling is to be applied to.

Logically, the most likely time is Bain Hazemanim which is designated as a time for bochurim to relax.

Consequently, at all other times, swimming will be banned.

But Reuven reckons that the Rosh Yeshiva really had the lunch-break in mind when he gave his ruling, so, in order to convince Shimon, he has to eliminate the possibility that it is really aimed at Bain Hazemanim.

Therefore, Reuven needs to set out to prove that it would be pointless for the Rosh Yeshiva to tell us that it is okay for us to go swimming during Bain Hazemanim, because we already know that!

So what time did he have mind?

He must have meant that we can go during lunch-break - So let's go!

Therefore, Reuven explains

2.  If you assume the Rosh Yeshiva had the most obvious time in.mind,

 3 That cannot be because we already know that it is okay to go  swimming during Bain Hazamanim

4. Because the Yeshiva itself organizes the trips.

.5 So, by a process of elimination, you must agree with me that  he was talking about the only alternative - during lunch-break.

Shimon can retort that Reuven's argument does not force him into a corner.

The Rosh Yeshiva might be talking about Bain Hazemanim and it still would not be superfluous, because there are other factors which would make us think the he bans swimming even during Bain Hazemanim.

What are the other factors? Well, this year, the Yeshiva is not organizing trips to the pool!

Therefore, he can respond:

.6 No! Your argument does not force me to agree with you.

.7 It could be that the Rosh Yeshiva is talking about Bain Hazemanim.

8. Because there are no trips to the pool this year (which takes.the steam out of your argumant) So I cannot risk going with you until we find out what the Rosh Yeshiva really meant.

 ìà ùðå àìà ..... àáì .........

What seems to be a general statement which is applicable to us, is actually referring to a particular situation and so does not apply to us.

An halalcha is stated, but the case to which it is to be applied is not specified. We would think that it obviously applies to our situation but that is not actually correct. Really, it applies to other circumstances.

Reuven said, "The Mashgiach said that we're not allowed to go swimming."

Simeon said, ìà ùðå àìà   " The Mashgiach was talking generally, about going swimming just for fun. àáì  But if the doctor tells you that you need the exercise, the Mashgiach will agree that because you need it for your learning, it is okay for you to go."

Analysis

1. Reuven stated a ruling based on what the Mashgiach said.

He assumes that the Mashgiach's statement applies to him because it was said without any qualifications as to when it applied to. Therefore, Reuven assumed that it applied to all times, to all people.

Shimon, however, knows that when the Mashgiach was speaking, he was speaking to a particular group - regulaur, healthy bochurim - regarding a specific time - when going swimming for fun.

Shimon could, therefore, assure Reuven that he does not fall into the catagory to whom the Mashgiach was referring.

So Shimon tells Reuven:

 2 The Mashgiach was talking generally.
3. About going swimming for fun.
.4 But the doctor told you that you need it
.5 So, I'm sure that the Mashgiach would agree that you can go swimming.

ìéîà ëúðàé

Let us say that this argument is over the same points as those which those Tannaim are arguing over.

Two Amoraim are arguing.

On this we ask-  "Shall we say that this is the selfsame point that these two Tannaim also argue over? "

If that is correct, the Amoraim should not argue as if it were their own dispute but they should align themselves with one or other of the Tannaim!

Reuven said, "Levi said that we can go swimming because it is healthy, but Yehuda said that it is forbidden because it is a waste of time!"

Shimon says, "That sems to be just what the Hanhala are arguing over!  - the Rosh Yeshiva says that swimming is healthy, but the Mashgiach says that it is a waste of time! If Levi and Yehuda want us to listen to them, they shold have quoted whoever is backing them!"

Analysis

1.  Reuven quotes two opinions which conflict - that of Levi and that of Yehuda.

.2 Shimon doubts whether they are arguing over that point because  we know that superior authorities differ in this matter. Therefore, they should have quoted those opinions instead of making it appear as if it were their own unique argument.

 îàé ìàå áäà ÷îéôìâé

Isn't it true that actually they are arguing over the following?

Regarding a certain halacha, one Authority decides one way and another Authority decides differently. Surely we can explain their difference of opinion in such a way that it will show that one of them agrees with me.

1. Reuven says, "The Rosh Yeshiva says that it is okay to go swimming, but the Mashgiach says that it is a waste of time.     îàé ìàå áäà ÷îéôìâé      Isn't it that they disagree over whether or not swimming is healthy. The Rosh Yeshiva reckons that it is healthy and the Mashgiach reckons that it is not healthy."

Possible response éůĺá              

2. Shimon says, "Not necessarily. Perhaps they both agree that it.
is healthy, but the Rosh Yeshiva was talking about during
lunch-break and the Mashgiach was talking about during seder."

Possible further response:

3. Levi says, "Or perhaps actually they both agree that it is not. healthy, but the Rosh Yeshiva was talking about during Bain Hazemanim when everyone messes around anyway and the Mashgiach was talking about during lunch-break when it is better for us to rest."

Analysis

1. The statements of the Rosh Yeshiva and of the Mashgiach clearly differ.

2. Reuven assumes that they differ because they have fundamentally different views on the benefit to be gained from swimming.

3. Shimon and Levi explain that that is not the only way to explain the difference between their statements.

4. It is possible that they agree with each other regarding the benefit of swimming, but issued apparently contradictory statements because they were referring to different circumstances.

 ìà îáòé ÷àîø

It does not need to say it

Sometimes, we try to deduce an halacha from a statement from the fact that a certain critical condition is not mentioned.

We assume that the fact that it is not mentioned proves that it does not apply.

But, really, the truth might be that the importance of the condition is so obvious that the one who made the statement assumed that we would understand its requirement.

Reuven says that it is okay to go swimming during lunch-break because the Mashgiach said that it is forbidden to go swimming during seder.

If the Mashgiach would have wanted to include the lunch-break in his ban on swimming, he would have told us that swimming is forbidden during lunch-break and we would realise ourselves that it is also forbidden during seder.

Shimon retorts that, actually, swimming is forbidden during lunch-break, but the reason why the Mashgiach did not mention it is because ìà îáòé ÷àîø it is so obvious that he does not need to say so.

The reason why he had to mention not going during seder is
because if the Doctor told us that we should go swimming, we
might think that we can then go even during seder.

      ÷î"ì So that is what he is telling us - even if the Doctor tells us, we cannot go during seder.

Analysis

1.  Reuven says that it is okay to go swimming during lunch-break because

i.    the Mashgiach said that it is forbidden to go swimming during seder,

ii.   we are more likely to think that it is okay to go swimming during lunch break than during seder.

iii.  Therefore, if the Mashgiach would have wanted to include the lunch-break in his ban on swimming, he should have told us that swimming is forbidden during lunch-break
and we would realise ourselves that it is also forbidden during seder.

iv.   But he did not.

v.    Therefore, he had no intention of banning swimming during lunch-break.

.2 Shimon retorts that,

i.     actually, swimming is forbidden during lunch-break.

ii.    Reuven based his reasoning on the fact that we are more likely to think that it is okay to go swimming during lunch break than during seder. Therefore, Shimon must explain why the Mashgiach did not mention it.

iii.   So, Shimon says that the reason why the Mashgiach did not mention it is because ìà      îáòé ÷àîø it is so obvious that he does not need to say so.

iv.    This now begs the question - if it is obvious that we cannot go swimming during lunch-break, it is even more obvious that we cannt go during seder! So why did the Mashgiach talk only about not going during seder?

v.     So Shimon explains that the reason why the Mashgiach had to mention not going during seder is because if the Doctor told us that we should go swimming, we might think that we can then go even during seder.

vi.    ÷î"ì so that is the point that he is adding to what we should already know - that even if the Doctor tells us, we still cannot go during seder.

   äëà áîàé òñ÷éðï      
What are the circumstances of the case we are talking about here 

    ..             ŕéěéîŕIf we say (it is like as follows..(     )so it cannot be like that(

but ŕěŕ (ěŕĺ)     )instead, is it not like this....?!!(

                        ěŕNo! we are not forced to agree with you

                      ěňĺěíReally (it is like this case which we considered before and rejected(

1. Reuven wants to go swimming during lunch-break

.2 Shimon says that the Mashgiach said that bochurim are not allowed to go swimming.

So, äëà áîàé òñ÷éðï when was the Mashgiach talking about? If you say he was talking about going swimmimg during seder, then that would be just too obvious for him to need to tell us that, àìà but you must agree that he was talking about going swimming during lunch-break. Therefore, Reuven should not go.

3. Reuven replies.,ìà" No! I am not forced to accept your conclusion. ìòåìí Really, I think that the Mashgiach was talking about going during seder. Even though it is obvious that we cannot go then, he still needed to tell us, because yesterday, he actually caught some boys sneaking out to go swimming during seder. ÷î"ì So that is why he had to tell us again that we cannot go swimming during seder. So you cannot prove that I should not go swimming during lunch-break."

Analysis

.1 Reuven assumes that there is no ban on going swimming during lunch-break.

.2 The Mashgiach did say that swimming is banned, but he did not mention when it is banned.

.3 Shimon wants to prove to Reuven that the Mashgiach must have been referring lunch-break when he spoke about the ban.

.4 Shimon quotes the Mashgiach who said that bochurim are not allowed to go swimming.

 Shimon then has to eliminate the possibility that the.5 Mashgiach is banning going swimming only during seder. This he does by proving that the Mashgiach would not need to tell us that swimming during seder is banned.

.6 So the only possible alternative is that he was banning swimming during lunch-break.

.7 Reuven replies that he is not forced to accept Shimon's conclusion.

.8 The possibility that the Mashgiach was referring to seder is not eliminated.

.9 Even though it is usually obvious that we cannot go then, he still needed to tell us, because yesterday, he actually caught some boys sneaking out to go swimming during seder.

ðéôìåâ åìéùðà áãéãéä

Let the Mishna then make that distinction within that class itself.

The Mishna tells us one halacha regarding Case One and another halacha regarding Case Two.

An Amoira insists that actually, the other halacha also applies to a special circumstance of Case One.

So we retort that if both the first halacha and the second halacha can be applied to Case One, the Tanna of Mishna should have limited himself to discussing just the one case, and applied the other halacha to a special circumstance of Case One.
Thus, he would use Case One alone to demonstrate the two halachas.

.1 The Rosh Yeshiva said that bochurim are allowed to go swimming during lunch-break, but they are not allowed to go to the store during seder.

.2 Shimon says that even though they are allowed to go swimming during lunch-break, they are still not allowed to go to the store during lunch-break.

3. Reuven responds that if the Rosh Yeshiva would have intended to forbid also going to the store during lunch-break   ðéôìåâ åìéùðà áãéãé        he should have told us both points regarding lunch-break. He should have told us that during lunch-break we can go swimming, but we are not allowed to go to the store.

Analysis

.1 The Rosh Yeshiva's statement refers to two activities and two times:

Activities		Times	
a. going to the store		i. seder	
			
b.  going swimming		ii. lunch-break	

 2 Shimon contends that the ban on going to the store applies. also to lunch- break.

3. Reuven counters that if going to the store is forbidden during lunch- break, it is most certainly banned during seder. Therefore, if Shimon's contention would be correct, the Rosh Yeshiva should have rather limited his statement to one time period. Then, referring to that period alone, he should have differientated between the permissibility of the two activities. The statement would then have been briefer and  more comprehensive.

4. Since the Rosh Yeshiv  rejected that format, Shimon must be wrong.

úñúééí

Let us sort it out

We know that there is an argument between two Rabbonim. We know that one of them has one opinion and one has the other opinion, but we do not know who holds which side of the argument. So, perhaps we can deduce from another statement of one of the Rabbonim which is his opinion.

.1 Reuven says,

i.   "I remember hearing both the Rosh Yeshiva and the Mashgiach each giving a talk.
ii.  One said that it is good to go swimming and the other said that it is not good to go swimming,
iii. but I do not remember who said what."

2. Shimon responds,

i.   úñúééí "      Let's sort it out.
ii.  I remember that the Rosh Yeshivah once told us that swimming is healthy.
iii. So we can assume that the Rosh Yeshiva is the one who said that it is good to go swimming."

   ...îðìï            ...... äëé äùúä ......
From where do we know that?       Now, let's see (does it make sense?(

We know that a halacha is derived from a certain source, but we can interpret the source to derive a different halacha. However, if we think about that second halacha, we will realise that it is not a reasonable halacha.

 .1 Reuven asks, îðìï" How do you know that we are not allowed to go swimming during lunch-break?

2. Shimon replies, "The Rosh Yeshiva said that we are not allowed. to go swimming. He could not possibly have been speaking about going during seder, because he has already mentioned that many times."

.3 "But perhaps he was referring to Bain Hazemanim?" suggests Reuven.

      . äëé äùúä" 4Let's see. Does that seem reasonable?" responds Shimon, "The Rosh Yeshiva  himself told us that we should relax and take plenty of exercise during Bain Hazemanim. So why should he ban swimming then?"

åìèòîéê  / åìãéãê

 And according to your way of reasoning...........

This is a response to an attack in which the defender shows the attacker that even according to the attackers own principles, the defender's opinion is correct.

Reuven says, "It is okay for me to go swimming during lunch-break because the Rosh Yeshiva said that it is okay."

Shimon retorts, "The Mashgiach, whose job is specifically to make sure that the bochurim behave themselves, said that swimming is not permitted during lunch-break."

Reuven replies, åìèòîéê" So according to what you are saying, how is it that you yourself go to the store during seder when the Mashgiach said that we are not allowed to go?

Isn't it because you know that the Rosh Yeshiva said that we are allowed to go, and you yourself know the the Mashgiach agrees that the Rosh Yeshiva has the last word in deciding Yeshiva policy.

So regarding swimming as well, you must agree with me that I can follow what the Rosh Yeshiva said and go swimming during lunch-break."

     åúðé .........     ÷à ôñé÷

[The Tanna) surely states decisively and learns

The Tanna states a Halacha in a general form, without stipulating many conditions. We therefore assume that the Halacha applies to all those conditions.

The Rosh Yeshiva said that we must not go swimmimg

Since he did not make any stipulations, we must assume that he meant it to apply in all circumstances.

So we must assume that we may never go swimming!

àîàé ìà

 Why not ? ? ! ! !

This is an appeal to our sense of logic. No particular reason is given - the reason is so obvious, we do not need to be told!

The Rosh Yeshiva said that we must not go swimmimg

I can understand why we cannot go swimming during seder, but to go swimming during lunch-break, why not       ? ? ? ! ! !  àîàé ìà

.......               ìà ùðà............åìà ùðà
       No difference....       And no difference......

The Tanna states a Halacha in a general form. He does not differentiate between this case or that case. We therefore assume that the Halacha applies to both those conditions.

Note: When the Gemara says ," ......... "÷à ôñé÷ åúðé it is pointing out that the Statement is without limitation and there applies in all circumstances.
When the Gemara says, "ìà ùðà............åìà ùðà..." it is directing us to the fact that it is not limited regarding one particular aspect.

"The Rosh Yeshiva said that we must not go swimmimg."

       ìà ùðà He makes no difference between  going during seder     åìà ùðàor going during lunch-break.

Therefore, we must assume that his ruling applies to both periods of the day.

THE  THIRTEEN  RULES  BY  WHICH  THE  TORAH  IS  EXPOUNDED

Though these thirteen rules are apparently based on standard rules of logic, they cannot be applied whenever you want to apply them.

Usually they will only be applied when a Tanna or an Amora has a tradition from his own Teachers that they are to be applied to that topic.

I have not given any examples from the Gemora, because I have assumed that the reader will refer to it when he is actually learning Gemora and already has an example in front of him.

If you wish to see examples of each, you can refer to the sources listed in the Bibliography, or see the commentary on the Thirteen Rules given in the weekday prayers of the ArtScroll Siddur.
1.          ÷ì åçåîø

Easy and stringent/how much more so...
Is it not logical that...

It is possible to refute this logic...
...indicates that it might stillbe true

Their common factor...		....÷ì åçåîø
...àéðå ãéï

....àéëà ìîéôøê
éåëéç........

...äöã äùåä ùáäï	

The easiest way to describe a ÷ì åçåîø is to play with simple examples.

Example1

If you can buy a loaf of bread with , ÷ì åçåîøyou can buy a bread with $100.

The ability to buy bread depends on the purchasing power of the money you have. $1 has little purchasing power, but $100 has a lot of purchasing power. So, if $1 (which has little purchasing power) has the power to buy a loaf of bread, so øîåçå ì÷ 100$        )which has a lot of purchasing power) has the power to buy a loaf of bread.

In this example, our idea of ÷ì and çåîø depends on the amount of money. Both $1 and $100 have the same quality - purchasing power.  has little value, so it is1$ .÷ì In contrast, $100 has great value, so it is .çåîø And whatever $1 can buy, $100 can surely buy.

Example 2.

If, when you put $1's worth of coins into the slot of a coin-operated vending-machine, you get a bar of chocolate, so ÷ì åçåîø if you stuff a $100 bill into the slot, you should get a bar of chocolate!

The ability to buy chocolate depends on the purchasing power of the money you have. $1 has little purchasing power, but $100 has a lot of purchasing power. So, if $1 (which has little purchasing power) has the power to buy a bar of chocolate, ÷ì åçåîø 100$        )which has a lot of purchasing power) has the power to buy a bar of chocolate.

But, obviously, this reasoning does not apply to a vending machine. The machine does not react to the value of what is inserted into its slot. It only reacts to its size and weight and
its ability to roll down through the mechanism. We can therefore dispute the .÷ì åçåîø

       àéëà ìîôøê we can argue with the reasoning behind this    .÷ì åçåîøThe ability of the coins to obtain a bar of chocolate does not depend on the value of the coins. It depends on their size, weight and quantity and ability to roll, in such a combination as to operate the mechanism of the vending machine. But a $100 bill does not have these qualities at all! Therefore we cannot relate a coin to a bill. A coin is not ÷ì compared to a bill.

Example 3

If, when you put $1's worth of coins into the slot of a coin-operated vending-machine, you get a bar of chocolate, so ÷ì åçåîø if you stuff a $100 bill into the slot, you should get a bar of chocolate!

       àéëà ìîôøê We can argue with the reasoning behind this .÷ì åçåîøA vending machine is designed to be operated only by coins. Therefore we cannot relate a coin to a bill. A coin is not   ÷ìcompared to a bill.

But this is not always true! Credit cards éåëéç indicate that vending machines can be operated by things other than coins. So, perhaps our original ÷ì åçåîø is true. Perhaps the vending machine really can detect the value of the article inserted into its slot.

Example 4

Reuven: Levi, who is younger than I am, got permission to go swimming. So ÷ì åçåîø I can go swimming.

Shimon: àéëà ìîôøê!  Levi hasn't been felling well. Perhaps he can go because the doctor said that he must go?

Reuven: Yehuda éåëéç shows us that it's not because of the doctor because Yehuda did not go to the doctor and he also got permission.

Shimon: Yehuda is representing us in the swimming competition. Perhaps Yehuda got permission because he has to practice?

Reuven: But Levi is not in the competition and he also got permission.

               ìà øàé æä ëøàé æä åìà øàé æä ëøàé æä

Permission doesn't depend on having a letter from the doctor because Yehuda is alright, and it doesn't depend on being in the competition because Levi isn't in it.

äöã äùåä ùáäï

So let's take their common factor. Both Levi and Yehuda are younger than me and they have both been studying well, And I have also been studying well. So, if they, who are younger than I am, can go swimming, ÷å"ç I can also go swimming.

At this stage, there is a point of contention. Both Levi and Yehuda each have their own outstanding reasons for going swimming    - Levi for his health and Yehuda to practice for the competition. Each reason on its own justifies an exeption to the rule banning swimming. Reuven has no outstanding reason to go swimming. Therefore we can object to his      ,÷å"ç

    éù áäï öã çîåø"    Reuven, how can you compare yourself to Levi and Yehuda? They each have their own very good reasons for going swimming, but you don't have any special reason!"

Reuven's reaction to this objection will depend upon how he understands the way the ban is issued. If we agree that a ban can be lifted for any good reason, then he will have to acquiesce that they do have good reasons and he does not and therefore there is no reason why the ban should not apply to him.

However, Reuven could maintain that the ban on swimming can be lifted for one reason only! We must try to find out what that one reason is. The need to go swimming for health  cannot be THE reason because Yehuda is healthy. The need to practice cannot be THE reason, because Levi is not in the team. Therefore, THE reason must be the common factor which Levi and Yehuda share -they have both been learning well. Reuven can maintain,

       "öã çîåø ìà ôøéê - Just because they each have their own good reasons does not detract from what I said. The ban on swimming can be lifted for only one reason, which cannot be health or to practice for the competition. The reason must be for the reason both Levi and Yehuda have in common - the fact that they have both been learning well, so I still maintain that I can definitely also go swimming because I have also been learning well and I am older than they are!"

      (òéï ñåèà ëè: îçìå÷ú øáé éåçðï áï æëàé åãåø àçøåðä)

2.   äé÷ù            âæøä ùåä
Decreed to be the same

Comparable		âæøä ùåä

äé÷ù	

There are two types of      .âæøä ùåä

The first type tells us that a term which is used in one place and carries with it certain laws, carries the same laws with it when it is used in another place.

For example, the Rosh Yeshiva tells us, "You are allowed to go out to go swimmimg, but only if you wear a hat and jacket."

Then he tells us, "You are allowed to go out to the store."

Since, when he told that we can go to the store, he used the term       "go out", we understand that we must wear a hat and jacket also then.

The second type, sometimes called a ,ä÷ů tells us that when the laws of one topic are written next to the laws of another topic, it was as placed there to tell us that one or more laws of the first topic apply also to the second topic, and also one or more laws of the second topic apply also to the first.

For example, the Rosh Yeshiva tells us, "You are allowed to go out to go swimmimg, but only if you wear a hat and jacket, and when you go to the wedding tommorow, make sure that you behave well and are a credit to the Yeshiva."

We understand that, because he put the two topics together, even though they have nothing to do with each other:

a. When we go swimming, we must behave ourselves and be a credit to the Yeshiva

b. When we go to the wedding, we must wear our hats and jackets.

3.                 áðéï àá                    îä îîöéðå

General construction

As it is found		בנין אב

מה ממצינו	

Generally speaking, once a law is given regarding one topic, we understand that it should be applied to all other similar topics.

For example, the Rosh Yeshiva tells us, "You are allowed to go swimmimg, but only if you wear a hat and jacket."

So we understand ourselves that we should wear a hat and jacket also when we go out of the Yeshiva, to go to the store or to go to a wedding, etc.

4.           ëìì åôøè
General statement followed by a specific statement		כלל ופרט	

When a person makes a general statement and then follows it with a specific example, his intention is that we should understand that the example illustrates how the general statement is to be applied.

For example, the doctor tells me, "You should relax! You should go swimming!"

From the example, I understand that he wants me to relax only by going swimming.

If the doctor would have only told me to go swimming, I might have thought that he is only suggesting one way to relax. So if I prefer lounging around in an armchair, I would do that instead. But, because he prefaced his advice with the general statement and then gave the example, I understand that he does NOT advise ANY form of relaxation, but only the type he recommended.

Therefore, when the Torah states a halacha in the form of a  ,ëìì åôøè       it is to tell us that the ëìì is to be applied in the way of the ,ôøè not in a way which is unlike the .ôøè

ëìì åôøè
 àéï áëìì àìà 
îä ùáôøè

5.         ôøè  åëìì
Specific statement followed by a general statement		ôøè  åëìì	

When a person gives a specific example and then follows it with a general statement, his intention is that the general statement should override the specific example and therby tell us that the general rule is not limited in any way.

For example, the doctor tells me, "Take some exercise by going swimming! Relax!"

By telling me to go swimming, the doctor is simply suggesting one form of relaxation. The main point he stressed at the end -      "  Relax!" By this, I understand that I can choose ANY form of relaxation, including lounging in an armchair, if that is how I can best relax.

If the doctor would have said only, "Relax!" I might have assumed that he meant the type of relaxation that he usually recommends -swimmimg.

So, the fact that he first mentioned swimming and then gave the general advice tells me that this time he is not limiting his recommendation only to swimming but he is now permitting ANY form of relaxation.

Therefore, when the Torah states a halacha in the form of a åëìì       ôøè it is to tell us that the ëìì is not to be limited in any way at all.

 ôøè åëìì
ðòùä ëìì îåñó òì äôøè åðúøáä äëì

 )If the Torah would mention only the ,ëìì we would assume that it is to be limited by any of the other rules. In the form of ôøè åëìì the ëìì may not be limited in any way.(

6. ëìì åôøè åëìì

General statement followed by a  specific statement followed by a general statemen		כלל ופרט וכלל	

When a person makes a general statement and then follows it with a specific example, his intention is that we should understand that the example illustrates how the general statement is to be applied. So, when he follows it up with a furthur generalization, we understand that he wants that example to serve as a model for that subsequent generalization.

For example, the doctor tells me, "You should relax! You should go swimming? Make sure that you relax."

From the example, I understand that he wants me to relax by taking vigorous exercise. By repeating the advice to relax, I understand that the need to relax overrides the specific example. But it does not override it entirely, otherwise he would have said, "Go swimming! Relax!"

So, the type of relaxation which the doctor has in mind is a form of exercise which is simmilar to swimming, though not necessarily as vigorous. Walking would therefore be recommended, but lounging around in an armchair is definitely not recommended.

Therefore, when the Torah states a halacha in the form of a åëìì       ,ëìì åôøè it is to tell us that the first ëìì is to be applied in a way similar to that of the ,ôøè not in a way which is unlike the .ôøè

ëìì åôøè åëìì
 àé àúä ãï àìà ëòéï äôøè
ìøáåú ëì äãåîä ìôøè åìîòè ëì îä ùàéðå ãåîä ìå

øáåé åîéòåè
a.   Inclusion and exclusion		רבוי ומיעוט	

When a person makes a general statement, he intends that it should include all possible examples which are included within the generality. When he then gives a specific example, he intends to tell us that we should exclude from the generality any case which is not like the example.

For example, the doctor tells me, "You should relax! You should go swimming?"

When the doctor tells me to relax, I understand that he wants me to relax in any way I want. So, when he then addds that I should go swimming, I understand that he wants me to relax by taking exercise, and he does not want me to relax by merely taking it easy.

Therefore, when the Torah states a halacha in the form of a  øáåé åîéòåè, it is to tell us that the éåáø is to be applied in a way similar to that of the èåòéî, not in a way which is unlike the èåòéîå   .

 øáåé åîéòåè
øáä äëì åîéòè ùàéðå ãåîä

 )So the effect of a øáåé åîéòåè is the same as a (ëìì åôøè åëìì  
îéòåè  åøáåé

Exclusion and inclusion	מיעוט  ורבוי	

When a person tells us a single case, he wants us to apply what he said to that one case. If he then tells us a more general description, he intends to add on to the one example he gave. He is merely widening the scope of the application. But the fact that he did first give one example tells us that this at least one type which is not included in the generality.

For example, the doctor tells me, "Go swimming! Relax!"

Clearly, the doctor wants me to relax any way I want. He originally mentioned swimming because he doesn't want me to relax by just lounging around.

 Therefore, when the Torah states a halacha in the form of a   ,îéòåè åøáåé       it is to tell us that everything is to be included in the       øáåé except one or more cases which are not like the .îéòåè

 îéòåè åøáåé
äîòéåè äåà ëîå ùðëúá àçø äøáåé åîîòè ìôçåú àçã

)You will notice that in ôøè åëìì the general statement contradicts the specific statement.
But in øáåé åîéòåè the general statement simply complements and adds on to the specific statement.(

c. øáåé åîéòåè åøáåé
Inclusion, exclusion and inclusion		רבוי ומיעוט ורבוי	

When a person makes a general statement, he intends that it should include all possible examples which are included within the generality.

When he then gives a specific example, he intends to tell us that we should exclude from the generality any case which is not like the example. So when he then goes and states another generality, he must intend to override the limitation and include absolutely everything.

So why did he state the example? He must have intended to tell me that he still wants to exclude one thing that is totally the opposite of that example.

What is that one thing? I do not know I will have to ask him.

For example, the doctor tells me, "You should relax! You should go swimming! Make sure that you relax."

When the doctor tells me to relax, I understand that he wants me to relax in any way I want.

So, when he then addds that I should go swimming, I understand that he wants me to relax by taking exercise, and he does not want me to relax by merely taking it easy.

When he repeats that I should relax, obviously, he wants me to relax in absolutely any way I like. So why did he mention swimming?

He must want to tell me that there is one way of relaxing which he does not recommend, which the complete opposite of swimming.

What is that type of relaxation?

I asked the doctor and he told me that I should not stay in bed all day!

Therefore, when the Torah states a halacha in the form of a åøáåé  ,øáåé åîéòåè it is to tell us that everything is to be included, except one case which the most unlike the example.

And it is left for the Rabbonim to decide what that one case is.

øáåé åîéòåè åøáåé
øáåé åîéòåè - øáä äëì åîéòè ùàéðå ãåîä
àìà ùçæø åøéáä àôéìå àåúå ùàéðå ãåîä
åìà îéòè ìê àìà ãáø àçã äéåúø øçå÷
åîñøå äëúåá ìçëîéí ìãòú àéæä ãáø øàåé ìîòè

The difference between those who expound in terms of ëìì åôøè and those who expound in terms of    øáåé åîéòåè is as follows:-

Those who expound in terms of ëìì åôøè regard the general statement as a  generalizing statement which widens the scope of the specific example.

And they regard the specific example as a limiting statement which reduces the scope of the general statement.

However, those who expound in terms of   øáåé åîéòåèregard the general statement as a statement which tells us what is to be included.

And they use the specific example to tell us what is to be left out.

7.           ëìì ùäåà öøéê ìôøè          ôøè ùäåà öøéê ìëìì

A rule which needs a detail
A detail which needs a rule		כלל שהוא צריך לפרט
פרט שהוא צריך לכלל	

This rule tells us that Rules 4 (ëěě ĺôřč) and 5 (ôřč ĺëěě) only apply when they give all the details required.

However, if a rule requires the explanation of some detail before it can be applied, or if a detail can only be understood with the backing of a rule, then the rules and details do not change each others scope.

For example, the doctor tells me, "If you don't feel well, you should relax! You should go swimming if your back hurts."

I cannot use the general advice "If you don't feel well, you should relax" because I don't know what he means by "If you don't feel well" - it is too vague. Does it mean that if I have a toothache, I should relax?

Therefore, I need the detail, "You should go swimming if your back aches" to put the general advice into effect.

Or, for example, the doctor tells me, "Go swimming! Relax!"

What type of swimming should I do? Should I swim myself to the point of exhaustion? Should I swim in ice-cold sea water? I don't know!

But when the doctor tells me the general advice "Relax!" I understand that he wants me to take a relaxing type of a swim.

8. ëì ãáø ùäéä áëìì åéöà îï äëìì ììîã ìà ììîã òì òöîå éöà àìà ììîã òì äëìì ëìå éöà

Any matter which was included in a
generality
but was singled out
to teach us a specific law
is not singled out to teach us
only about itself
but to teach us about
the entire generality	 כל דבר שהיה 
בכלל 
ויצא מן הכלל
 ללמד 
לא ללמד
 על עצמו יצא 
אלא ללמד
 על הכלל כלו יצא	

"Boys, you are allowed to go out during lunchtime, but don't forget - when you go and come from swimming, you must wear your hat and jacket!"

This rule tells us that when the Rosh Yeshiva singled out going swimming to tell us about wearing a hat and jacket, he was only using it as an example. Really, he wants us to understand that whenever we go out, we must wear our hats and jackets.

9. ëì ãáø ùäéä áëìì åéöà  ìèòåï èòåï àçø  ùäåà ëòðéðå éöà ìä÷ì åìà ìäçîéø

Any matter included in a
generality
but was singled out
to be explained differently
though still basically the same,
it was singled out to be lenient,
not to be stringent
	 כל דבר שהיה
 בכלל 
ויצא  
לטעון טעון אחר
  שהוא כענינו 
יצא להקל
 ולא להחמיר

"Boys, you are allowed to go out during lunchtime, but don't forget - when you go, you must go wearing your hats and jackets! Try not to run out to the store too often."

Really, going to the store is already included in the general
phrase "When you go out."

So when the Rosh Yeshiva refered to going out to the store as "running out", he must have singled it out like that to tell us that when we go to the store, we do not have to put on our hats and jackets.

"Running out" is only another way of saying "going out".

10. ëì ãáø ùäéä áëìì åéöà ìèòåï èòåï àçø ùìà ëòðéðå éöà ìä÷ì åìäçîéø

Any matter which was included in a
generality
but was singled out
to be explained differently
to be unlike the generality
was singled out to be lenient
and to be stringent.
	ëì ãáø 
ùäéä
 áëìì
 åéöà 
ìèòåï èòåï àçø
ùìà ëòðéðå 
éöà 
ìä÷ì 
åìäçîéø	

"Boys, you are allowed to go out during lunchtime, but don't forget - when you go, you must go wearing your hat and jacket! But, when you visit your relatives, make sure you come back in time for seder."

I would have thought that visiting relatives is also called "going out", so I would assume that we must wear our hats and jackets.

But now that the Rosh Yeshiva has singled it out and referred to it as "visiting", I do not know what to do.

Perhaps he means that because its only to relatives, we can go without hats and coats, or perhaps he means that we must be extra careful and brush our shoes as well.

11.    ëì ãáø ùäéä áëìì   åéöà   ìãåï áãáø äçãù àé àúä éëåì ìäçæéøå ìëììå   òã ùéçæéøðå äëúåá ìëììå áôéøåù
Any matter which was included in a
generality
but was singled out
to be given a new law
cannot be reincluded in the generality 
until the Torah stipulates it
explicitly
	    ëì ãáø ùäéä
 áëìì  
 åéöà   
ìãåï áãáø äçãù 
àé àúä éëåì ìäçæéøå ìëììå 
  òã ùéçæéøðå äëúåá ìëììå
 áôéøåù

"Boys, you are allowed to go out during lunchtime, but don't forget - when you go, you must go wearing your hats and jackets! But you can visit your relatives any time, provided you have a letter from your parents."

I would have thought that visiting relatives is also called "going out", so I would assume that we must wear our hats and jackets.

But now the Rosh Yeshiva has singled it out and given it a new status - we can go to visit anytime, so long as we bring a letter.

This means that he does not regard "visiting relatives" as a usual type of "going out". The usual type of "going out" is only permitted during lunchtime and we do not need a letter.

Therefore, whatever he now says about "going out" does not refer to when we go to visit relatives.

12.    ãáø äìîã îòðéðå  åãáø äìåîã îñåôå
A matter which is learnt from
the immediate context
A matter which is learnt from
the end of the passage	    ãáø äìîã îòðéðå 

åãáø äìåîã îñåôå

	

"Each member of our Yeshiva must go dressed as a true representative of the Yeshiva. His hat must be brushed and his jacket must be clean! You may go swimming during lunchbreak."

Sometimes, when a person makes a statement, he expects you to understand that you should take into account the general context of the statement.

In the above example, since the Rosh Yeshiva has just been stressing that the we must always look good, I understand that if we do go swimming, he expects us to wear hats and jackets and look neat and well groomed.

"Each member of our Yeshiva must go dressed as a true representative of the Yeshiva. His hat must be brushed and his jacket must be clean! And do not forget to get permission from the Mashgiash before you go swimming "

In the above example, the Rosh Yeshiva finishes off his speech by reminding us that we must obtain special permission befor we can go swimming. We can tharefore assume that when he told us that we should be well dressed when we go out of the Yeshiva, he assumes that we have obtained permission to go.

13.    ùðé ëúåáéí     äîëçéùéí æä àú æä  òã ùéáåà äëúåá äùìéùé  åéëøéò áéðéäí

Two quotations
which contradict each other
until a third quotations comes
which decides between them
	   ùðé ëúåáéí 
    äîëçéùéí æä àú æä 
 òã ùéáåà äëúåá äùìéùé 
 åéëøéò áéðéäí	

I didn't know what to do! 

Reuven said that the Rosh Yeshiva said that we can go swimming and Shimon said the Rosh Yeshiva said that no-one is allowed to leave the building!

Then Levi came and told me that the Rosh Yeshiva told him that the usual permission to go swimming has been revoked and we all must stay in.